



PHOTOSTAT FACSIMILE

REPRODUCED FROM THE COPY IN THE

HENRY E. HUNTINGTON LIBRARY

FOR REFERENCE ONLY. NOT FOR REPRODUCTION

BC
61
L31
1581a

**CORNELL
UNIVERSITY
LIBRARY**



**BOUGHT WITH THE INCOME
OF THE SAGE ENDOWMENT
FUND GIVEN IN 1891 BY
HENRY WILLIAMS SAGE**

Date Due


RP.

RR 1/28

Handwritten signature: *Handwritten signature*

~~MAY 16 '84 N 29~~

MAR 11 1964



Cornell University Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.

THE LOGIKE OF THE MOST EX- CELLENT PHILOSOPHER

P. R A M V S Martyr:

*Newly translated, and in diuers places corre-
cted, after the winde of the Author.*

PER
M. Roll. Makylmenzum Scotum, rogatu viri ho-
nestissimi, M. Ægidij Hamlini.



Imprinted at London by Thomas Vautrol-
lier dwelling in the Blackefrieres.

1 5 8 1.

Cum Privilegio.

Cornell University Library

BC61 .L31 1581a

Logike of the most excellent philosopher




3 1924 029 147 861

olin

THE
OF THE MOST
TOGETHER
The liuely pithe of Platoes vvitte
and Aristotles ingenie,

The pleasaunt vaine of Cicero,
and of Quintiliane

The iudgement highe, here thou
mayst see: therfor if thou be vwise
No farther seeke but in this booke
thy selfe doe exercise.



Printed in London by Thomas Vautour
his dwelling in the Bishopstons

1 2 2 1

Printed in London



TO THE VVORSHIP-
FULL M. ROBERT WYKES
OF DODINGTON IN THE
Countey of Glouceter
Esquier.

ALLEXANDER King of Ma-
cedone (most Worshippfull Me-
canas) not so much for his va-
liant and marriall failes (al-
though they were most villo-
rians) as for his great loue and ardent zeale
which he bare to vertue and knowledge, hath
bene of all men had in most worthy estimation
and goodly memorie. Iob called the seruants
of God, although he was worthy to be praised
of all men for his iustice and equitie, yet he
was most commended for his singular patience
in time of tribulation and great calamities. But
when I considere with my selfe your insatiable
desire and most fervent loue, not onely in the
following of your owne studie, but also in the
promouinge, and furtheringe of others: your
greate patience and incredible constancie, in

4
sufferinge affliction and abiding equitie: I am
compelled to confesse that there is none neither
amongest the prophane and ethmicke authours,
neither amongest the ecclesiasticall and spiri-
tuall Fathers (of what estate or qualitie soe-
uer they were) with the which ye may not be
compared, yea or rather preferred. For if A-
lexander were praised that in the middest of
his triumphant victories he did beare abroad
with him Ilias the famous worke of Homer co-
ntaining the battailes and destruction of Troye:
How much more are ye to be commended that
in the middest of your calamitie do both night
and day where soeuer ye be, carie and reade
a more worthy and pretious worke? Alexan-
der in prosperitie tooke pleasure to reade Ho-
mere treating, of martiall factes, so thende he
might guide his armie according to the exacte
rule therein declared: ye take pleasure in ad-
uersitie to read the holy Scripture and worde
of God, so thende ye may gouerne your life ac-
cording to the will and commaundement of
God. Where Alexander was, there was pro-
phane Homere: where ye are there is the holy
Bible. When Alexander did sleepe Homere
was his boulder: when ye doe sleepe, the Bible
is your pillow: Alexander for all his riches is
praised

praised for the continuall reading of one booke:
what shall I then say of you that haue bestowed
no little parte of your goods in buying of most
worthy workes. Iob which is set before our
eyes the example of a singular patiēce being ex-
treamely afflicted in outward thinges, and in
his body, through his great tormentes and af-
flictions brasted forth into many inconueniences
both of wordes and sentences, and shewed him
selfe as a desperate man in many thinges, and
as one that would resiste God. Ye hauing no
lesse occasion to complaine being most vniust-
ly spoiled of your goods troubled in minde and
conscience, threatened dayly by your enemies
doe notwithstanding constantly resiste acknow-
ledging God to haue secret iudgements, to
chastise those Fatherly whome he loneth, and
to let the reprobate runne to destructiō. These
and other your most singular vertues hauing
considered and experimented the good will and
minde which you beare to the furtheraunce
and setting forth of all sciences, I coulde finde
none more apte, or worthy under whose name
this golden treasure should come abroad, then
his whose vertue and good behauiour, might
geue some place and authoritie to the same. For
although: hereby many more adorned with

riches and possessions of this worlde yet in set-
ting forth of vertue and singular patience I
find none at all. Now therefore to conclude
(Sithence, I know you to be most alienated
from all ambition) I beseeche you to receiue,
this my small present in good parte, hauing ra-
ther respecte to the minde of the geuer then to
the gifte it selfe, although most pretious. So I
commende you to the protection of God almightie
wishing his heavenly Maiestie, that ye may
constantly perseuer as ye haue begonne, both
in your spirituall and temporall affaires, so
thende that ye liuing Godly in this worlde may
obtaine that heavenly Crowne of glorie which
our Saviour Iesus Christ hath prepared to all
those that doe patiently watcke for his ap-
pearinge: to whome with the Father
and the holy Ghost be all laude,
honour and praise world
without ende.



THE

THE EPISTLE TO THE READER CONTAINING THE OCCA-

*sion of the setting forth of this booke, the vertue and proficience
of the same, the use and facilitie, with the declaration of
three golden documents or rules appertaining to the matter of
every arte: and last a briefe declaration of the methode and
forme to be observed in all artes and sciences.*

SE E I N G it is the dewtie of all Christians (beloued Reader) to labour by all meanes, that they may profite and aide their bretheren, and to hide or keepe secret nothing, which they know may bring greate vtilitie to the common wealth. I thought it my dewtie (hauing petceiued the great commoditie which this booke bringeth to the Reader of what state and qualitie soeuer he be) to make thee and all others to whose knowledge it shall come pertakers therof. But least thou thinke that thy labour and paine should be lost in reading of the same, seeing so many bookes going abroad vnder glorious names, hauing in deede litle or no vtilitie, but wrapped all together with innumerable difficulties: I shal in few wordes shew thee, the matter contained in this booke, the methode and forme of the same, how easie it is aboute all others to be apprehended, how thou shalt applie it to all artes and sciences, and shortly that no arte or science may either be taught or learned perfectly without the knowledge of the same. As for the matter which it containeth, thou shalt vnderstand that there is nothing appertaining to Dialecticke either in Aristotles xvij. bookes of Logike, in his eight bookes of Philosophie, or in his xiiij. bookes of Philosphie, in Cicero his bookes of Oratorie, or in Quintilian (in the

which there is almost nothing that doth not either appertaine to the inuention of argumentes or disposition of the same, but thou shalt finde it shortly and after a perfecte methode in this booke declared. For thou shalt finde no argument which is not either referred to one of the nine argumentes artificiall, or to the vnartificiall: no sorte of disposition which doth not appertaine either to the iudgement of the proposition, Sillogisme or Methode. But thou wilt saye how is it possible that this litle booke is able to containe all that, which the forenamed bookes (being so many) doth entreate? In deede thou hast no litle occasion to maruell, but (hauing more deeply considered the matter) I beleue thou shall not maruell so much. For in this booke there is three documentes or rules kept, which in deede ought to be obserued in all artes and sciences. The first is, that in setting forth of an arte we gather onely together that which doth appertaine to the Arte which we intreate of, leauing to all other Artes that which is proper to them, this rule (which may be called the rule of Iustice) thou shalt see here well obserued. For here is all which doth appertaine to Logike, and nothing neither of Grammer, Rethoricke, Phisicke, nor any other Arte. This is that documente which Apelles many yeares ago did signifie vnto vs, for whē as the Shoemaker reprehended the shooe of Apelles image, Apelles tooke it in good parte, because it did appertaine to the Shoemakers arte: but when passing his boundes he began to finde faulte with the clothes also, Apelles said to him, *Nihil Sutor ultra crepidam*, which signifieth that the Shoemaker should keepe him within the boundes of his arte. And therefore
beloued

9
(beloued Reader) all those which either write or teach either diuinity, Phisicke, the law or any other thing do violate and breake this document, when they degresse from their purpose and do raile vpon other things nothing paitaining thereto. For howsoeuer they write or teach (so it be from their purpose) it is to be had of no estimation, Is he not worthy to be mocked of all mé, that purposeth to write of Grammer, and in euery other chapter mingleth something of Logicke, and something of Rethoricke: & contrary when he purposeth to write of Logicke doth speake of Grammer and of Rethoricke? that takerh a text to preach of fasting and disputeth the most parte of his howre of images or swearing? that promisetb to shew me the causes and signes of the stone, and telleth me many tales pertaining to the gowt? that when he is asked of contractes or obligations, aunsweteth of libertie or bondage? Or if the Astrologian being asked of the eclips of the sunne, should aunswere me some thing concerning the motion of the starres? And yet we see the most part of our learned men both in their teaching & writing (to the great hurte and damage of youth) most vnshamfully do vse the same which I would to God were amended. The second document (which diligently is obserued in this booke) is that all the rules and preceptes of thine arte be of necessitie true, which Aristotle requireth in the second booke of his Analitikes, and in diuerse chapters in his former booke. Thou shalt violate this document, whesoeuer amongst thy preceptes in writing or teaching thou shalt mingle any false, ambiguous, or vncertaine thing: as if in teaching me my logicke, which consisteth in rules to inuent argumentes, &

to dispoſe and iudge the ſame, thou ſhouldeſt begin to tell me ſome trickes of poiſonable ſophiſtry: and when thou ſhouldeſt teach me the worde of God truly thou goeſt about to deceiue me by telling me mans inuentions: and if thou ſhouldeſt (being deſtitute of good argumētſ to proue thy matter) be like ſome auncient writer to beguile the rude and ignorant people, or forge ſome Authors to colour thy knauery which neuer was, or wrot at any time. I doubt not (gentle reader) but thou haſt read of ſuch fellows: alwayes call thou vpon God that it will pleaſe his heauenly Maieſtie to plant this our rule of veritie in the hearts of all men, but moſt chieſie in the breſtes of the Paſtors of the Church, who haue the charge and diſpenſation of his holy worde. The thiſde document which thou ſhalt note herein obſerued is, that thou intreat of thy rules which be generall generally, and thoſe which be ſpeciall ſpecially, and at one time, without any vaine repetitions, which doth nothing but fill vp the paper. For it is not ſufficient that thou keepe the rule of veritie and iuſtice, without thou obſerue alſo this document of wiſedome, to diſpute of euery thing according to his nature. Do not intreat therefore generall matters particularly, nor particular matters generally, for in ſo doing thou playeſt the Sophiſters part, as Ariſtot. teacheth in the firſt booke of his poſteriors, and ſhalt be compelled to uſe tautologies & vaine repetitions which thou knoweſt to be moſt pernicious to all artes and ſciences. For if I aſke thee what is Logicke? and thou anſweereſt, that which teacheth to inuent argumentes, thou anſweereſt truly but not wiſely, becauſe thou intreateſt a generall thing particularly: I aſke thee for the definition

finition of the whole arte, & thou guesst me the de-
 finition of inuention, which is but a part of the arte.
 And cōtrarie: if I aske thee what is inuention, & thou
 answerest an arte which teacheth to dispute well,
 surely thou answerest not wisely, for thou intreatest
 a particular thing generally: I aske of thee, the defi-
 nition definition of the of a part of the arte & thou
 guesst me the whole arte. Note well these three ru-
 les in reading of thine Authors: see, if they intangle
 them selues, with thinges nothing appertaining to
 their purpose: if they trouble thee with ambiguous
 or deceitfull speakings, and do not handle euery
 thing after his nature. Take the fornamed bookes,
 and with the rule of iustice geue to euery arte his
 owne, & surely if my iudgement doth not farre de-
 ceauce me, thou must giue some thing to the arte of
 Grammer some thing to Rethoricke, something to
 the foure Mathematicall artes, Arithmeticke, Geo-
 metrie, Astrologie and Musicke, something also (al-
 though but litle) to Phisicke, natural Philosophie, &
 diuinitie. And yet all that is in these bookes (onely
 the fore-said digressions excepted) doth appertaine
 either to the inuention of Logicke, or els to the iud-
 gement. Now gather together that which remain-
 neth, after euery arte hath receiued his owne, & see
 if there be any false, ambiguous or vncertaine thing
 amongst it, & if there be (as in deede there is some)
 take thy document of veritie, & put out all such so-
 phisticall speakings. And last perceiue if all thinges
 be handled according to their nature, the generall
 generally, & the particuler particularly, if not, take
 thy rule of wisdom, & do according as the third do-
 cument teacheth thee: abolish all tautologies & vaine
 repetitions, & so thus much being done, thou shalt

comprehende the rest into a litle rome. And thus much concerning the matter intreated in this booke The forme and methode which is kept in this arte, commaundeth that the thing which is absolutely most cleare, be first placed: & secondly that which is next cleare, & so forth with the rest. And therefore it continually procedeth from the generall to the speciall and singuler. The definition as most generall is first placed, next followeth the diuision, first into the partes, and next into the formes and kindes. Euery part and forme is defined in his owne place, and made manifest by examples of auncient Authors, and last the members are limited and ioined together with short transitions for the recreation of the Reader. This is that only perfect method which Plato & Aristotle did know obserued by many noble writers both Historiographers, Orators, & Poetes & now last (being suppressed by ignorance many yeares) raised as it were from death by the most learned & Martyr to God, *Petrus Ramus*, who hath not only proued with strong arguments, but in very deede set before our eyes that this perfect methode may be accommodate to all artes & sciences. What shall we say the of those, that in teaching & writing (to the great hurt of the memorie), doth put as it were the taile formost, hauing no regard how euerie thing is placed, but euen as it chaunseth to come into their Mouthe, so letteth it go, Did euer Plato or Aristotle so? no in deede. But that thou maiest a litle the better perceiue the vtilitie of this arte, and how farre thee vse of it doth exted, I will shortly shew thee how thou shalt accommodate the same to all artes and sciences, setting before thine eyes one or two for an example. And first

First what arte soeuer thou purpolest to intreate of,
 thou must come garnished with these three, Iustice,
 Veritie, & Wisedome, as before is saide: and then if
 thou be a diuine this methode willerh thee that in
 place of the definition, thou set forth shortly the
 summe of the text, which thou hast taken in hande
 to interpret: next to part thy text into a few heads
 that the auditor may the better retaine thy sayings:
 Thirdly to intreate of euery head in his owne place
 with the ten places of inuention shewing them the
 causes, the effectes, the adioints & circumstances: to
 bring in thy comparisons with the rest of artificiall
 places: and last to make thy matter plaine & mani-
 fest with familer examples & authorities out of the
 word of God: to set before the auditor (as euery
 head shall giue thee occasion) the horrible and
 sharpe punishing of disobedience, & the ioyful pro-
 mises appertayning to the obediēt & godly. Yf thou
 be a Phisicion & willing to teach (as for example)
 of a feuer, this methode willet h thee to shew first
 the definition, that is, what a feuer is next the diui-
 sion, declaring what sort of feuer it is, whether the
 quartane quotidian, hecticke, or what other: thirdly
 to come to the places of inuention, & shew first the
 causes of the feuer euery one in order, the efficiēt,
 as may be hōte meates, the matter as melancolie,
 choler, or some rotten humor, and so forth with the
 formale causes and finall. The seconde place is the
 effecte, shew then what the feuer is able to bring
 forth, whether death or no. The third place wiseth
 thee to tell the subiect of the feuer, whether it be in
 the vaines, artiers, or else where. The fourth to shew
 the signes and tokens which appeare to pretende
 life or death: and to be shorte. thou shalt passe thow

rough the rest of the artificiall places, and doctra which is required in euery of them. And last comes to the confirming of thy sayings by examples, authorities, & (as Hippocrates & Galen haue done) by histories & long experience. After this method Heraclitus the Philosopher examined the physicians which came to heale him, & because they were ignorant & could not answer to his interrogations he sent them away, & would receiue none of their Medicines: for (said he) if ye can not shewe me the causes of my sicknes, much lesse are ye able to take the cause away. So the lawyer shall plead his cause, in prouing or disproving after as his matter shall require, with these ten places of Invention, & dispose euery thing orderly into his propositions, syllogismes, & method. So shall the Orator declaine: the Mathematician set forth his demonstrations: and to be short both in writing, teaching & in learning, thou mayest alwayes keepe these three golden documents in intertaining thy matter, and this most ingenious & artificall method for the exactness & disposition of the same. After that sort of seruant of the forsaid materiall documents and natural method thou hast this litle booke set forth in thee which being well perused is able to bring more profit to thee (I speake after experience) then all thy former yeares study in Plato or Aristotle as they are now extant. And beside the great vtility which thou shalt apprehend of this booke, the facilitie and easines of the same is not a litle to be commended. For here thou hast nothing to learne (and yet thou shalt learne all) but only ten places of inuention with the disposition of the proposition, syllogisme, & methode. Euery place of inuention & euery booke of

disposition is made so cleare & manifest with ex-
 amples chosen out of the most auncient Authors,
 That almost by thy self (if thou haue any quicknes
 of spirit) thou maiest attaine in the space of two mo-
 nethes the perfect knowledge of the same. Here I will
 speake nothing of the enuious, that thinketh it not
 decem to write any liberall arte in the vulgar ton-
 gue, but would haue all thinges kept cloist either
 in the Hebrew, Greeke, or Latine tongues. I know
 what great hurt hath come to the Church of God
 by the defence of this mischeuous opinion: yet I
 would offer them one thing, that thou maiest know
 their deceitfull policie, and that their saying hath
 no grounds of veritie. Whether wrote Moyses (the
 Hebrew and diuine) and after him Esdras in the
 Hebrew & vulgar tongue or in some other strange
 tongue? Did Aristotle and Plato Greeke Philo-
 sophers: Hippocrates and Galen Greeke Physicians:
 leaue the Greeke tongue, because it was their native
 language, to seeke some Hebrew or Latine? Did Ci-
 cero, who was a Latinist borne writ his Philosophie
 & Rhetorike in the Greeke tongue, or was he content
 with his mother tongue? and surely as he testified
 him selfe he had the perfect knowledg of the greke
 tongue, yet he wrote nothing therein which we haue
 extant at this daye. Shal we then thinke the English
 or Scottish tongue, it not fit to write any arte istan-
 ding in deed, But peraduenture thou wilt say that there
 is not Scottish words for to declare and expresse all
 thinges contained into liberall artes, truth it is nei-
 ther was there Latine words to expresse all things
 written in the Hebrew and Greeke tongues: But did
 Cicero for this cause write no philosophie in Latin
 thou wilt not say so, lest I take thee with a manifest ly

What then did Cicero? he laboreth in the Latine tongue, as Aristotle before him did in the Greeke, and thou enuious fellow ought to do in thy mother tongue what soeuer it be, to write he amplified his natie tongue, thinking no shame to borrow from the Hebrucians & Greeccians such words as his mother tongue was indigent of. What, shall we thinke shame to borrow either of the Latine or Græke, more then the learned Cicero did? or finde some fit words in our own tongue able to expresse our meaning as Aristotle did? shall we I say be more vnkind to our natie tongue & countrie then were these men to theirs? But thou wilt say, our tongue is barbarous and theirs is eloquent? I aunswere thee as Anacharis did to the Athenienses, who called his Scythian tongue barbarous; yea sayth he, Anacharis is barbarous amongst the Athenienses, and so are the Athenienses amongst the Scythians, by the which aunswere he signifieth that euery mans tongue is eloquent enough for himselfe, and that others in respect of it is had as barbarous.

Thou seest (good Reader) what a ground they haue to defend their opinions, & how they labour only to roote out all good knowledge & vertue, & plante meere ignorance amongst the common people. Now for to conclude; it shalbe thy durie to receiue this my litle paynes in good patte, and to call vpon God that the vse thereof may tend to the glorie of his holy name & profit of our breatherne.

THE

THE FIRST BOOKE
OF DIALECTICKE.

CAP. I.

*Of the definition and diuisions of
Dialecticke.*



Dialecticke otherwise called
Logicke, is an arte which
teacheth to dispute well.

It is diuided into two
partes: Inuention, and iudge-
ment or disposition.

Inuention is the first parte of Dialecticke,
which teacheth to inuente argumentes.

An argumente is that which is naturally
bente to proue or disproue any thing, such
as be single reasons separatly and by them-
selues considered.

An argumente is either artificiall or with-
out arte.

Artificiall is that, which of it selfe declare,
and is either first, or hath the beginning
from the first.

The first is that which hath the beginning
of it selfe; and is either simple or compared.

The simple is that, which simple and absolutely is considered: and is either agreeable or disagreeable.

Agreeable is that, which agreeth with the thing that it pzoneth: and is agreeable absolutely, or after a certaine fashion.

Absolutely, as the cause and the effect,

CAP. II.

Of the cause efficient.

The cause is that by whose force the thing is: and therfore this first place of inuention is the fountaine of all sciences: for that matter is known perfectly, whose cause is vnderstanded: So that not without good reason, the Poet doth say:

Happy is the man withouten doubt,

Of things who may the causes well finde out.

The cause is either efficient and materiall, or formall and finall.

The efficient is a cause from the which the thing hath his being. Of the which although that there be no true formes, yet a great aboundance we finde by some certaine meanes distincte.

And first the thing that engendzeth or deserveth is called the efficient cause. As Duibe,
in

in his first booke of the remedy for loue, call-
leth Slothfulnesse the efficient cause of
loue, which being taken away loue ceaseth:
for thus he there saierh:

When curable thou shalt appeare therefore,

By my science thy health for to attaine.

Geue eate, this is my counsaill euer more,

From slouth and idlenesse thou do abstaine.

For these to filthy lust thy minde prouoketh,

And do maintaine that, which they haue once
wrought.

These be the causes with foode that nourisheth,

This euill which now is pleasant in thy thought.

The father also, and the mother which en-
genyeth, & the nurses which bring vp, are
causes efficientes. As Dido. in the 4. booke
of *Eneid* being sorely offended with Ae-
neas, and seeking a cause of his crueltie, de-
nieth him to be Venus or Anchises sonne,
and saierh other parentes to him.

O false Aene thy selfe why dost thou faine,

Of Venus faire the Goddess sonne to be:

Or that Anchise which dardam hight by name.

Thy author was by waye of parentie,

For dreadfull Caucasus did thee beget,

On terrible and ragged rockes in filde:

And raging Tygres norishes was set,

To geue the sucke of vdder rude and wilde.

So Romulus was builder of Rome, and
after him, Kinges, Consulls, Emperours

and Tutorz were the byholders of it: which all are called causes efficientes.

CAP. III.

SEcondly the cause efficient is either solitarie or ioyned with some others, of the which some be principall and chiefe doers, others helpers & seruers to the principall. An example of the cause solitarie we haue in the 9. of *Eneidos*:

Here, here, am I (o Rutilleus) in me

Your swordes bare, thrust in with pithie hande.

The fraude is mine, I am the cause onelie

The impotent nothing durst take on hande.

The solitary cause with others diuerse both principalles and adiuuantes in the Oracion which Cicero wrote for Marcus Marcel: lus is diuersly shewed.

For often time (sayeth the Orator) some vseth to extenuate martiall vertues by wordes, and pull them away from the Captaine and principall doers, and communicate them to Souldiers, that they should not be proper to the Gouvernour of the warre: And certainly in warre, the fortitude of the Souldiers, the oportunitie of places, the aide of the Allies, naues, & prouision of victualles helpeth much: and fortune lawfully doth ascribe to her selfe the greatest parte, so that whatsoeuer is pro-
spe-

sproules done, that almost all she esteemes her owne. But of this glorie (o Cesar) which thou hast not long agoe obtained thou hast no fellow: for all how much soeuer it be (which verely is most greate) all I saye is thine, for neither the Centurion, the Captaine, the bonds of men, nor yet the troupes, may plucke any thing of this away from thee: yea that more is, fortune that mistresse of all thinges offereth not her selfe in the societie of this glorie. Shee geneth thee place, and confesseth this glorie wholly to be thine owne.

The instrumētts also are numbꝛed amongst the causes adiuuantes. By this argument the Epicure proueth that the worlde was neuer made, as Cicero testifieth in his first booke of the nature of Goddes.

With what eyes of minde (sayeth he) might your Plato beholde that composition of so great a worke, by the which he maketh the worlde to be made of God: what labouring: what toolles: what barres: what scaffoulds: who were seruantes of so great a worke?

This vngodly Epicure knew not that God was able to make the worlde without any instrument, or other causes either materiall or adiuuante.

Thirdly the cause efficient worketh by it selfe, or by accident.

The efficient by it selfe is that, which worketh by his owne strength. such as by nature or counsell do worke. As for example the naturall working of the windes is set forth in the first booke of the *Enchiridion*:

Then Eurus rose with Northeast raging blast,
Vpon the sea, all tossing from the ground.
And Notus with a cruell noise right fast,
Of Whistling winde did blister vp and downe.
And Africus with rustling tempest rush't,
Fourth of the Sowthe, the roaring sea to moue.
So that the stormie waves from deape out busht,
And raised was the sandie bankes about.

The confession of Cicero containeth an example of counsaile: as,

The warre being taken up, yea and almost ended (o Cesar) by no strength of haude, but of mine owne winds and will I come vnto these warres, which were raised against thee.

By accident the cause worketh, which by some externall power worketh, as in those thinges which are done by necessitie, or by fortune.

By necessitie, when the efficient is compelled

led to do, Such a one is the excusation of the Pompeians:

If I would seeke (sayeth the Orator) a proper and true name of this our sorrow, there appeares a fatall calamitie to be suddenly fallen, which hath premented vnawares the mindes of men: So that no man ought to marvel that the counsells of mortal men are overcome by the fatall necessitie of the Goddes.

Fortune is a cause by accident, when besides the intente of the worker, some other thing chaunceth: as,

By chance (sayeth Cicero in his 3. booke of the nature of Goddes) Iason was healed by his enemy, who with stroke of sworde opened his rotten impostume, which the Phisitions could not heale.

Amongest these sorte of causes, ignorance or lacke of foresight is numbred: as, Quide, in the 2. booke of sorrowfull matters excuseth him selfe & lamenteth that he hath seene by chance some of Cæsars secrets: as,

Why did I see or yet beholde with eye,

What was the cause, I did by sight offende.

And vnto me vnwise and foolishly whye,

Was euer the faulte by any maner kende.

Although by chance that Acteon did see,

The nude Diane vpon the hearrie bent.

B iiii

Yet for all this she did make him a praye:

To his owne dogges which him in peeces rent.

Wherefore I see, that happe or negligence,

Among the Goddesses, no mercie hath at all:

But who so doth by fortune or by chaunce,

Offende the Goddesses, they shal in trouble fall.

Here riseth the asking of pardon, as Cicero
for Ligarius.

*Pardon and forgiue father he hath erred,
he hath done amisse: he thought not to do so:
if euer he shall doe such a thing againe? &c.*

*And a little after, he sayeth, I haue erred:
I haue done rashely: I repent me of my doing:
I flie to thy clemencie, I aske pardon, I praye
thee that thou wilt forgiue me.*

The ignorance of the cause raiseth the opi-
nion of fortune. For when any thing chan-
ceth beside the hope & entension of the doer,
it is commonly called fortune. And there-
fore wisely it is saide of Iuuenall.

If wisdom presente be,

There is no God absente:

But fortune we thee set on hie,

And eke a Goddess vaunte.

C A P. V.

Of the materiall cause.

The matter is a cause of the which the
thing hath his being: as, Diuide in the
2. booke

2. booke of the Metamorphosis, setteth forth the composition of the Sunnes howse, by the materiall cause, as, golde, carbuncle stone, puerie, and silver.

The princelie Pallace of the fire Sunne

Which Pillor hawte, surmounted farre the skie;
With glistering golde, and eke with precious stone,
In forme of flame, ascending vp on hie.

Whose toppie aboue was laid in fyne order.

With luorie smothe in colour whyte to see.

The duple doores were made of syluer pure:

Casting their beames vpon the doore entrie.

Cesar in the first booke of ciuill warres commandeth his souldiers to builde Shippes of such a matter as they had learned before in Brytaine, To witte, that they should make the keele and bottome of some light & lieger matter, and the rest of the bodie of the Shippes with twigges couered with lether.

CAP. VI.

Of the formall cause.

The efficient and materiall cause being expounded, now foloweth the formall and synall.

The formall cause is that by the which the thing hath his name and being. And therefore every thing is distinguished from another by his fourme.

The forme also is engendred togeather, with the thing it selfe: as, a reasonable soule is the forme of man, for by it man is man, and is distinguished from all other things. The Geometrical figures haue their forme, some being triangles, and some quadrangles. So hath naturall things: as the heauen, the earth, trees, fishes and such others. So that euery thing is to be expounded as the nature of it is, if we may attaine to the knowledge thereof, as in artificiall things is moze easie to be founde. Cesar in his 7. booke, setteth forth the forme of the walles of Fraunce.

The walles of Fraunce are almost builded after this forme: The beames of on peece direct in longitude, euery one being equally distant from another, are set on their two endes in the earth, hard bound within, and couered with a great countermure. The place betwixt the beames are stuffed up before with great stones: These being so placed and set togeather, there is added to, ouer aboue the same another ranke, so that the same space and distance is alwayes kept, that none of the beames do touch another, but ech beame being distant from the other by an equall space, is fast ioyned togeather

ther with stones, set in betwixt beame and beame. And so consequently, the worke is ioyned togeather untill the height of the walles be accomplished and filled up. And this worke is both wel fouored, by reason of his forme and varietie: hauing here a beame and there a ranke of stones one after another, obseruing their ranks in a straight line: And also it is much conuenient for the profit and the defence of cities. Because both the stone doth keepe it selfe from daunger of burning, and likewise the stuffe and matter from rushing or beating downe: Which for the most part being made fast fortie footes inward with continuall ranks of beames, may neither be broken shorrough, nor beaten a sunder.

On this maner doth Virgill describe the forme of the hauen.

There is with in this long place solitare,
 An Isle extending out two pointes right farre.
 Making a rode, where bankes on euery side,
 From the deepe sea the waters do deuide.
 And turne in maner of a goulfe right deepe,
 On either side be hilles and bankes so steepe.
 Most huge and high eke from the sea do rise,
 Two fearefull rocks, which seeme to touch the
 skyes.
 Vnder whose toppes, the waters in their place,

Came without sturre, 'dothe seeme to holde
their peace.

Fast by a groue and woodc are to be sene,

With fearefull shade & shaking leaues grene.

Right ouer against this front thou maiest perceiue,

On hanging rocks, a darke den or a caue.

Within the which are springing waters sweete,

With seates of stone, a howse for Nymphes most
meete.

Within this hauen, when wearye Shippes do lande,

They haue no neede of cable nor of band.

Nor croked ancors pyched to make fast,

For they be sure from all tempestuous blast.

CAP. VII.

Of the finall cause.

The finall cause is that for the which the
thing is made or done. The ende, of na-
turall thinges is man, and of man, God. Al-
so euery arte hath the finall cause: as, The
ende of Grammer is to speake congroullie,
of Rethoricke, eloquently, and of Logicke
to dispute well and orderlie. Iuno. 1. of E-
neidos, promiseteth to Aeolus the faire Nym-
phe diopeian for solace and procreation of
chilozen.

Nymphes I haue of body fayre and bright,

Fouretene, wherof she that diopeian hight:

Most beawtiful, I will in wedlocke giue,

To thee Aeole that she with thee may liue.

For

Forthy reward the whole course of her age.

Indoting thee with gift of parentage.

In the defence of Ligarius, Cicero bringeth his accusator Tubero, with the finall cause of the warres rayled against Cesar, & surely (saith he) he toynd battall against Cesar in armes.

What did thy naked sworde (o Tubero) in the Pharsalike armie? whose sides pearced the pointe therof? which was the sence and feeling of thy weapons? what minde, eyes, hands? what feruencie of spirite? what diddest thou conet or desire? what diddest thou wishe?

CAP. VIII.

Of the effect.

The effect is that which riseth of the cause And therfore the mouing of things that are engendred, corrupted, or by any other manner of way moued: and the thing also that by the mouing riseth is called the effect, as for example, Christ in the 11. Chapter of Mattheu proueth him selfe by this place, to be the true Messias promysed: being asked of Iohn Baptistes disciples, Arte thou he that shoulde come, or shall we look for another? And Iesus answering saide vnto them.

Go and shew Iohn what thinges ye haue harde
and seene: The blynde receiue their sight: the
halt go. the leapers are censed: the deaf heare.
the dead are raysed vp: and the poore receiue
the Gospell: and blessed is he that shall not be
offended in me, the sayinges and woꝝkes of
men are contained vnder this place as the
wise mens sayings and Platoes and Ari-
stotles woꝝkes, counsailes also and delibera-
tions althoughe they neuer take effect.

Virtue also and vyce haue their effect, as
Horace in the first booke of his Epistles,
setteyth soꝝth the effect of dronkenesse: as,
What thing is not through dronkenesse commit?

For hid secretes he maketh come to light:
Hope most vnſure, full ſure is made by it,

And naked men conſtrayned for to fight.
From penſiue mindes, all care it taketh away.

Science and artes full often doth he teach:
Full cuppes of wine, at ſome time do not they,
Make ignorant be eloquent in ſpeech?

The ſtrength of wine, doth it not eke make free,

The poore man from all care and heuines:

Forgetting all his former pouertie,

Vnmindefull of his dolorous diſtreſſe?

CAP. IX.

Of the ſubiect.

Now followeth the argument which
booth agree after a certaine faſhion: as
the

the Subject and the Adiopt. The Subject is that which hath any thing adioyned vnto it, as the soule is the subject of knowledge, ignorance, vertue, vice, because these are added to the soule, besides the substance of the same. The bodye is the subject of health, sicknes, strength, infirmitie, beauty, deformitie, and such others. A man, is the subject of riches, pouertie, honours, infamie, clothes, and of his traine. A place is the space in the which the thing placed, is contained: So the Philosophers doe attribute to their diuine substances (although void of all magnitude) a place: So the Geometricians vnto their figures Geometricall, giue both place, and the differences of places. The naturall philosophers also moze accuratly in the heauen, simple elements, and compounde things, both acknowledge a place: Which is nothing else, but the subject of the thing contained in it: as for example.

The lande of Canaan (a subject) is prayed in the 12. of Numerie by the adioyntes of things adioyne vnto it.

So Moyses sent them to spie out the lande of Canaan, and saide vnto them: goe vp thie

waye towarde the southe, and goe vp into the mountaines; and consider the lande, what it is, and the people that dwell therein: whether they be strong or weake, either fewe or many. Also what the lande is that they dwell in, whether it be good or bad: and what Cities there be that they dwell in, whether they dwell in tentes, or walled townes: And what the lande is, whether it be fatte or leane, whether there be Trees therein or not, and be of good courage, and bring of the fruite of the lande. And after fortye dayes they returned againe and toulde Moyses, saying, we came in to the lande whither thou hast sent vs, and surely it floweth with mylke and honye: and here is of the fruite of it, neuertheless the people are stronge that dwell in the lande, and the cities are walled, and exceeding great: And moreover we sawe the sonnes of Anacke there: The Amel-kytes dwell in the south countrie, and the Hethites and the Jebusites, and the Amorites dwell in the mountaines, and the Cananites dwell by the sea, and by the costes of Iordan.

Here Canaan is the subject: The people of the lande, the cities, the frutes trees, and the goodnes and badnes thereof is the adiunction

iointes for the which it is either praised or
dispraised.

CAP. X.

Of the adiointes.

The adioint is that which hath a subiect
to the which it is adiointed : as , vertue
and vice are called the adiointes of the body
or soule : and to be shorle all thinges that
do chaunce to the subiect, beside the essence,
is called the adioint : as, time, qualitie , ei-
ther proper : as laughing to men : barking
to dogges : or common : as in the example
following. Cicero in the Oracion for Ros-
cius Comodus.

*Doth not his very head and ouer browe al-
together shauen and scraped so cleane , signifie
that he is malicious and fauoureth of knaue-
rie ? doe they not utter and crye that he is a
craftie foxe ? Doth he not appeare from the
toppe of his head to the sole of his fete (if the
proportion and figure of the body without any
speaking or uttered wordes may bring a conie-
cture) that there is nothing in him but craftie,
desceipte , and lying : who therefore hath his
head & ouer browe alwayes scrapen and sha-
uen, least some should haue the occasion to saye*

C

that he had an heare of an honest mā. So doth
Partiall in his 2. booke, mocke **Zoilus**.

Thy heare is red, thy mouth is blacke with all,

Thy feete are shorte, one eye thou hast to see:

Zoile, if thou be good, we may say all,

There is no litle faulte committe by thee.

Clothes also, and thinges parraining to our
 traine are numbred amongst the adiointes:
 as, **Dido**, passing to the hunting, is set forth
 magnifickly by her adiointes, in the fourth
 booke of **Eneidos**.

In the meane time while that **Aurora** bright,

Left the maine sea ascending vp on height:

And **Phæbus** rising brought the light of daye,

The choosen lusty youth in best araye

Wente out the stretes towards the porte or gate,

Hauing their nettes with meshes wide and greater:

And hunting staues with Iron heads sharp & broade

The marciall horsemen, next after rushing roode:

With Spaniall dogges, which hunt by perfect sent.

Great multitude also were there present:

Them which of **Carthage** greatest Princes beent,

Abiding all the comming of the **Queene**.

Which as yet in chamber did abide,

Thou shouldst haue sene eke standing there beside:

A Princely horse most goodly to beholde,

Richely arrayed in purple and fine golde.

Of courage fierce, a beast for fight most fitte:

With frothing teeth byting his bridle bitte.

And last of all the **Queene** her selfe comes out,

Accompanied with souldiers in great roure:

With purple cloke beset about with gardes,

Hauing

Having a qucauer, well furnished with dartes:
 Behinde vpon her shoulders eke did hange,
 Her platted heares like bright golde glyttering:
 Her purple clothes most comely to beholde,
 Were knite and tyed with claspes of shining golde.

CAP. XI.

Of differing argumentes.

THe agreeable argumente being expounded, now followeth the disagreeable, which dissenteth from the matter. The argumentes disagreeable are equallie known among them selues, and disproueth equalie one another: yet by their dissention, they do moze clearlie appeare. They be parted into differing argumentes, and gaynesettes.

The differing argumentes be such, as be disagreeable by some fashion onely: and are known by these notes: not this, but that: although, notwithstanding: as, Cicero for Pompey.

They did not bring home the victorie, but the signes and tokens of the victory. And Dido 2. of Ioue: Vlysses was not faire, but he was eloquent. Also Virgill. Although Priamus was almost dead, yet he did not abstaine: Likewise Terence in Eunuchus: Although

I be most worthy of this contumelie, yet thou art unworthy to do it unto me. Also Cicero for Ligarius, Callest thou it a mischeuous acte o Tubero? Why? surely as yet it was called by no man so: some in deede called it an error, others feare: some naming it more hard, either hope, desire, hatred or obstinacie, those that call it most hard, name it rashnes: a mischeuous acte, no man as yet but thou.

C A P. X I I.

Of gynesettes, or opposita.

Gynesettes are argumentes alwayes disagreeing, so that they may not be attributed to one parte of a thing after one respect, and at one time: as, Socrates can not be white and blacke on one parte: father and sonne of one: sicke and whole at one time: yet he may be white on a parte, and blacke on an other, father of one man, and sonne of another: hole this daye, and sicke to morow: And therefore vpon the affirmation of the one, followeth the negation of the other. And contrariewise also. Gynesettes are parted into disparates and contrary argumentes.

The disparates are gynesettes of the which
the

the one is opposed to many: as, greene, as the colour, read, are midde colours betwixt white and blacke, of the which euery one is a disparate argumente both with the extremities, and among themselves also. So liberalitie, a man, a tree, a stone, and other things innumerable, because that one of these can not be said to be the other: as, Virgill 1. of Eneidos.

O Virgine what should I call thee, for thy visage and voice declareth that thou art no mortall woman, Truly thou art a Goddess.

CAP. XII.

Of Relatiues.

Contrary arguments are gapnesettes, of the which the one is only opposed to the other: and be parted into affirmatiues & negatiues. They are called affirmatiues when they both affirme: as the relatiues and repugning argument. The relatiues are contrarie affirmatiues, of the which the one hath his being of the mutuall societie & affection with the other, for the which cause they are called Relatiues: as, he is a father which hath a sonne, and he is a sonne which hath a father: for by this mutuall relation they are and cease to be both at once. So that who-

soeuer knoweth the one perfectly, knoweth
the other also, as **Parciall** against **Solibian**.

Thy father when Solibian,

Thy maister thou dost call:

Thy selfe then dost thou graunte certaine,
Seruaunte to be withall.

Athanasius proueth the eternity of the sonne
of God thus: as, *It is not possible that a fa-
ther may be before the sonne (meaning of the
relation:) But the father hath ben father from
the beginning (as all men do graunt) ergo the
sonne hath ben from the beginning. And Quin-
tilian in his 5. booke the 10. chapter, sayeth
thus, If it be honest to the Rhodians to set out
the custome, it is honest also for Hermacrion
to hyer it: Here (set forth) and (hyer) are
relatiues. After the same maner Cicero in
his booke de Oratore sayeth: Is there any
daunger (sayeth he) lest some should thinke it
filthy, to teache others a glorious and excel-
lent arte, the which to learne was most honest.
Here (teache) and (learne) are relatiues.
These also the aduocate and client: the les-
sor and the lesse: free and bonde: bigge and
litle: the hoste and the guest: the husband
and the wife, with such others.*

CAP,

CAP. XIII.

Of repugning argumentes.

The repugning argumentes are contrary affirmatiues, which among them selues do repugne continually: as, *Eneidos* 11.

There is no health in warre, therefore we aske the peace. So hotte and colde, white and blacke, vertue and vice, repugne.

Likewise Cicero in *Parad.* against the Epicurians. They helde this opinion stowly and diligently do defende, that pleasure is felicitie, which appeares to me to be the voice of brute beastes, and not of men, for thou when God or the mother of all thinges nature, hath given to thee a soule of all thinges most excellent and diuine, so thou contemptuously castest awaye and abasest thy selfe that no difference thou esteemest betwixt thee and a brute beast.

Here Cicero opponeth beastes and man: as, pleasure is beastes felicitie, therefore it is not mans, So libertie and seruitude: as in *Cibullus* 2. booke.

Hard seruitude I see to me prepared

In time to come my mistresse for to be:

Fare well therefore thou which hast me decored,

Freedome and eke paternall libertie.

CAP. XV.

Of denying argumentes.

C iiij

Contrarie negatives, are when the one affirmeth and the other denieth the same. And are parted into denying and de-
priving argumentes.

Denying argumentes are contrarie negatives, of the which the one denieth euery where: as, Iust, not iust: a beast, not a brast: blood, not blood: as Cicero in the defence of Murena.

Thou shalt forgiue nothing, yes some thing, not all. Grace shall haue no place, yes when office and duty requireth, Be not moued with mercie, yes in dissoluing of seueritie, yet there is some praise of humanitie. I stand to my purpose, yea surely, without a better get the victorie.

Also Maritall in his first booke,

We know Fabella thou art faire,
A maide also, true thou, so are:
And riche with all who may withstand?
But when thou dost to much prepare,
Thy selfe with praises to vp bare:
Then neither art thou riche, nor faire,
Nor Virgine I dare take in hand.

Likewise Cicero in the first booke of his Tusculane questions compelleth the Epicurian by this argumente to graunt that the dead are in no miserie: which thing the Epicu-

Epicurian defendeth. Nowe (sayth he) I had rather thou shouldest feare, Cerberus the dogge with three heades porterer of hell, then that thou shouldest so vnadvisedly speake these wordes. Atticus. What is the matter? Marcus. The same which thou deniest to be, thou admittest to be. Where is the Sharpnes of thy understanding? For when thou sayest that the dead be in miserie, that thing which is not, thou admittest to be. And after a long disputatiō, Atticus saith, Now I graunt that they are in no misery which are dead, because that by strength of argument thou hast obtained that those which be not at al, are none in miserie. This fellow (saith Terence in his Eunuch.) sometime affirmeth & some time denieth.

CAP. XVI.

Of deprining argumentes.

DEprining argumentes are contrary negatiues: of the which the one denieth vpon that subiect onely, in the which the other which affirmeth, is naturally contained. And the affirmatiue is called the habite, the denyng argument, the priuation. So mouing and quietnesse: Sobrietie and Drunkennesse: as Partiall in his 9. booke.

*There is no sober man that would do so,
Ergo thou art dronke.*

*So to be blinde and to see: Rich & poore:
as Martiall in his 8. booke.*

*If poore thou be, thou shalt alwayes be
poore Emilian, for nothing is now geuen: but
to the rich. Of this sort be life and death: as
Cicero for Milo. Sir you reuenger of this mans
death, whose life if you thought it might be re-
stored ye would not.*

*To speake also and to holde peace: as the
first for Catiline: Why dost thou waite for
the authoritie of the speakers, whose mundes,
thou perceauest by holding their peace.*

CAP. XVII.

Of equall argumentes.

Compared argumentes are those which
are compared amongst them selues,
and are equally known, although the one be
sometimes more manifest and cleare then
the other.

The comparison is either in quantitie or
qualitie.

Quantitie is that whereby the thinges
compared are known how much or how lit-
tle they are.

And

And qualitie is either of equall or vnequall things.

They be equall which be of one quantitie.

The equall argument is, when an equall is declared by an equall: whose signes and notes be equall, alike, the same that as well as, as much as, as many as, neither more nor lesse: There is a great aboundance of such comparisons in the holy Scripture, as the most parte of the parables which Christ vseth: as in Matthew. 11.

The kingdome of heauen is like a graine of musterdseede, Deut. 11. Also I will cause thy seade to multiplie, as the starres of heauen. This argument is diuersly vset by the Chyricke authours: as Cicero for Sulla:

Neither may I perceiue wherefore thou art moued against me: if because I defende him whom thou accusest: why am I not moued with thee also that accusest him whome I defende: if thou saye I accuse mine enemy: I aunswere a like, I defende my frende. So the 5. of Tuscul. When as they graunt no little strength to be in vice, to liue a miserable life: must it not be also graunted, the same strength to be in vertue to liue godly? This also I praye thee tell me Xenophons wife (saith

Aspasia if thy neighbour had golde more precious then thou hast, whether hadest thou rather haue hers then thine owne? hers sayth she, & if she had clothes & the rest of the ornamentes of women, of greater estimation then thou hast, hadest thou rather haue hers? yea sayth she: Go to then if she had a better husband then thou, hadest thou rather haue her husband also? here she was ashamed to aunswere. Then *Aspasia* began to speake to *Xenophon*, I pray thee sayth she, if thy neighbour had a better horse then thou, whether hadest thou rather haue his or thine? his sayth he: and if he had a better grounde then thine, hadest thou rather haue his? his, to wit the best: and if he had a better wife then thou haddest thou rather haue his also? here *Xenophon* helde his peace also.

CAP. XVIII.

Of the more.

They be vnequall which be of a diuerse quantitie.

The vnequall be either more or lesse: That is more, whose quantitie exceedeth: whose notes are, not only, but also: I had rather this then that: seeing this, much more
that:

18, Eccle. 24. Beholde that I haue not laboured for my selfe onely, but also for all them that seeke wisdom. Psalm 84. I had rather be a doore keeper in the house of my God, then to dwell in the Tabernacles of wickednes. Rom. 5. But God setteth out his lone, that he hath to vs, seeing, that while we were yet sinners, Christ dyed for vs: much more then now (seeing we are iustified in his blood) shall we be saued from wrath through him. For if when we were enemies we were reconciled to God by the death of his sonne: Much more, seeing we are reconciled, we shalbe preserued by his life. Not onely so, but we also ioye in God by the meanes of our Lorde Iesus Christ, by whome we haue receaued reconciliation. And Cicero for Milo: Not onely he yeilded him selfe to the people, but also to the Senate neither to the Senate onely, but also to the strong garrison of souldiers. yea not to these onely, but to his power & authoritie to whom the Senat hath geuen cure of the whole common wealth, of the whole youth of Italie, and of the whole munition of the people Romaine.

CAP. XIX.

Of the lesse

That is saide to be lesse which an other
doth excede by quantitie : whose notes
be these: not this onely, but not that: this be-
foze that: as Cicero for Catiline. 2. *There*
was no man not only in Rome, but in no corner
of Italy overlaid with debt whom he had not
associate to the incredible leage of that mische-
nous enterprise. Cicero in Philippica. 9. All
men whatsoeuer age they be, which in this ci-
tie haue the knowledge of the lawes, if they
were gathered togeather in one place, are not
to be compared with Seruius Sulpitius. Quid
in the remedie for loue.

Seeing the body for to bring out of thrall.

Both sworde and fier gladly thou wilt endure:
Thy soule for to relieue, nothing thou ought at all,
For to refuse seeing it is more pure.

CAT. XX.

Of the similitude.

The compariser as yet hath ben in quā-
tite, now foloweth the comparison in
quality: By the which we know what kinde
of one thing is, whether like or unlike.
These are saide to be like which be of one
quality: as Deut. 23.

Woe

Woe be vnto you Scribes and Pharisees, ye hypocrites, for ye are like vnto whynadunbes which appeare beautiful outward, but are within full of dead mens bones, and of all filthines, so are ye also: for outward ye appeare righteous vnto men: but within ye are all full of hypocrisie and iniquitie. Gen. 1. Furthermore God sayde, let vs make man in our owne image according to our likenesse. Phillip. 2. Let the same mynde be in you that was euen in Christ Iesu, who being in the forme of God, thought it no robbery to be equall with God, but he made him selfe of no reputation, and tooke on him the forme of a seruant, and was made like vnto man, and was founde in his apparel as a man. And 1. Eneid. Both his mouth and shoulders were like a God. And Cicero in 9. Phillip. Although Seruius Sulpitius might leaue no monument more cleare, then his sonne, which is the very picture and shape of his conditions, vertue, constancie, pietie, and engine. The similitude is either seperated or ioyne together. The similitude seperated is when the 4. or single termes are seperated and distinguished, as in Mat. 23. Ierusalem, Ierusalem, which killest the Prophets, and stonest them which are sent to thee;

how often woulde I haue gathered thy children together, as the hen gathereth her chickens vnder her wynges, but thou wouldest not. And Virgill in Eglog. 5.

What thing that sleepe and rest on grasse,

To wearie men appeare:

The same to me of thy sweete verse

The melodie so cleare.

Here, as the hen to her chickens so God is to the Israelites: And as slepe to the wearie, so verse is to the hearer. And againe Cicero ad fratrem I. *As the best gouernours of Shippes often times maye not overcome the strength and rage of the tempest: So the most wise man may not alwayes vanquish the insurrection and violence of fortune. The ioynded similitude is when as the first terme hath it selfe to the seconde, so the second to the thirde: as Cicero 3. Ligat. Perceauie ye not that the magistrate hath the power to oversee and prescribe good and profitabie thinges agreeing with the lawes. For as the lawes are aboue the magistrate, so the magistrate is aboue the people.*

CAP. XXI.

Of the dissimilitude,

They

They be vnlike whose qualitie be di-
 versities 2. Peter 6. Lord God of Israell
 there is no God like thee. And therefore the
 Ethnick Antiquens vse this argumente.
 There is nothing like God; therefore God can
 no wise be knownen, by any image or signe made
 by men. The author of the booke of Kinges
 2. the 18. chapter. Having declared the
 gods qualities, the which Cleypab was ap-
 oined with, sayeth thus: He trusted in the
 Lord God of Israell, so that after him, was
 none like him among all the Kinges of Iude,
 neither was there any such before him. Co-
 rinth 2. Phillipic. Hath a greates compa-
 nie of dissimilitudes, speaking of Marro his
 groundes which Antonius had obtained by
 strong hand. O miserable buildinges (sayeth
 he) by how vnlike a maister (but how is he a
 maister?) were they with holden: Nowe can
 I not woulde they haue bene for his studies,
 and not a resorting place for filthy lustes, what
 excellent thinges were spoken before within
 that manner place, what thinges there writen?
 The lawes of the people Romaine: The monu-
 ments of our forefathers, all manner of wisdom
 and learning: But now since thou hast dwelled
 on this ground of having no righte there, all the

house ringeth with the clamour of drunkards, the flore overfloweth with wine, the walles be moiste: children of good inclinations with those that were set for aduantage, and whor's amongest mens wines were dwelling.

C A P. XXXI.

Of offpringes.

WE haue hether to expounded the first argumentes: Now do follow those which haue their beginning of þ first, which beareth them selues to the thing that they proue or disproue, as the first whences they are diuinen. Such be offspringes: the etimologie, distribution, and definition.

Offspringes are argumentes which do begin alike, but ende diuersly: as iust, iustice, iustly: freedom, free, freely: loue, louer, louely: good, goodnes, goodly: man, manlynes, mālynes, Iustice is fledde out of the Realme, therefore there is no man iust within the Realme. Propertius lib. 2.

Sence freedom to no louer doth remaine,

No man is free, that doth to loue giue minde.

Here freedom is the cause why thou art free. Cicero 3. booke of the nature of Goodes, when he speaketh of Dionysius the tyrant:

Now

Now (sayeth he) he chargeth that all the golden tables should be taken out of the Temples in the which (after the fashion of the Grecians) it was written of good Goddess, saying he would use their goodnes. The Goddess are good, therefore their goodnes is to be used. Were he distinguished from the effects to the cause also. He is a man, why may he not be then manly.

CAP. XXXIII.

Of the Notation or Etimologie.

THE Etimologie is the interpretation of a worde: For wordes are nothing else but notes of matters signified: as Isaac, was so called because his mother laughed at the promise of God made to her. And in the 25. of Genesis, is sayd, Afterwarde came his brother out, and his hande helde Esau by the heels, therefore his name was called Iacob: that is to say: an overthrower or deceiver. And therefore Esau being twice deceived by Iacob, sayeth thus in the 27. of Genesis, Was he not iustly called Iacob, for he hath deceived me now two times: He tooke my birth right: and loe now he hath taken my blessing. **Gen. 2.** And she called his name Moses, because saide she, I drew him out of the water.

The Hebrewes vse to geue their sonnes and their daughters names which might euer put them in remembraunce of some pointe of religion, and knowe when they come to perfection, that they were of the chosen people. And therefore Nabuchadne-
 ser 1. of Daniell, commaundeth the chiefe of the Eunuches to geue other names to Daniell, Anania, Mithraell, and Azaria, which were chosen to stande in the Kinges palace, and teache the learning and tongue of the Caldeans. The Grecians did vse the same, for some were called Timotheus, that is to saye, an honour of God: some Philotheus, which is a loue of God: some Demosthenes, the strength of the people: and therefore (some saye) that Aeschines his mortall enemie shoulde haue sayde thus: shouldest thou be called Demosthenes? no not so, but rather *Demonorus*, that is a deuourer of the people. So doe we in the Scottische tongue (to sturre the youth to the imitation of them whose name they beare) call some Abraham, others Isaac or Iacob, and some Susanna after the Hebrewes: And againe other some Timothie, and Christofor after the Grecians. This argumente is copiously
 vfed

used amongst the Ethnicke authoꝝ : as
Cicero 4. *Verr.* O trimme Swippings? for
 to what place didest thou euer come, to the
 which thou didest not bring with thee this
 daye? To what house, to what citie, yea and
 shortly to what Church? which thou didest
 not leaue spoiled? cleane swipped behinde thee?
 Therefore these thy doinges maye well be cal-
 led swippings, not so much for thy name (al-
 though thou be named *Verrēs*, which may sig-
 nifie a swipper) as for thy maners and nature.
Cicero 2. *Philip.* *Bambalio* was father to
 thy wife, a man of no estimation, and aboue all
 thinges contempned: who for his stutting and
 stamering of his tongue and dulnes of spirite,
 had this surname *Bambalio*, for a rebucke and
 a taunte. The phisicians also do geue names
 to their herbes: to some from the cause: as
Hirundinaria, from the inuentor: *Filipen-*
dula, from the foꝝme: To other some, from
 the effecte and woꝝking: as *Selfe whole*, and
 such like: from the subiecte and place: as *pa-*
rietaria, and *sea trifolie*. From the adiointe
 and qualitie, as stinking *Marubium*, deade
 nettle: from the similitude which they haue
 with other thinges: as *Mouse eare*, *foxe*
taile, *dogges tongue*: And so foꝝth from the

rest of the places of inuention. The vse then of this place is, to proue or disproue, praise or dispraise any thing by the Etimologie of it: as in the former examples, thou mayest perceiue.

CAP. XXIIII.

Of the distribution.

YET there remaineth of the argumentes which haue their beginning of others. The distribution and definition: both the one and the other both reciprocate: in the distribution, the whole with the partes: in the other the definition, and the thing that is defined. Distribution is a diuision of the whole into his partes. The whole is that which doth containe some partes within it. The parte is that which is contained of the whole: And as the deuiding of the whole into his partes, is called distribution: So the collecting of the partes to the whole, is called induction. The distribution riseth of argumentes, which doth agree with the whole, but among them selues doth disagree. And therefore how much the whole with the partes agreeth, and the partes among them selues

selues disagreeeth: so much is the distribution moze accurate.

CAP. XXV.

Of distribution taken from the cause.

THe first sorte of distribution is of those that agreeeth absolutely, to witte, the cause and the effecte. The distribution is taken from the cause, when the partes are causes of the whole. So Grammer is parted into Etimologie and Syntaxe. Rethoricke, into Elocution and Action: Dialecticke, into Inuention and Iudgement. For of these partes the artes do consist: So Virgill deuiderh his Georgickes into fower partes: as,

Heare first I will descriue what is the cause,
Doth make the corne so pleinfull to rise:
Vnder what signe and moneth of the sunne,
Thou shalt begin, to till thy filde and ground:
Eke at what time thou may vnto the elmes.
Set to the vines, and so shortly, after this,
What care thou ought to haue of thy oxen,
And of thy cattell the fode and husbanding:
And last of all how greate experience,
The sparing bees haue into their science.

Cicero for Murena. I vnderstand (honorable Iudges) that their was three partes of the as-

cusation, one in rebuking and blaming of his life: an other in contencion and strife of dignitie: The third to consist in the crimination of unlawfull sute for offices. Catullus doth vse this argumente both from the partes to the whole, and from the whole to the partes: as,

Faire Quintia to many doth appeare
 White, long, and streight, she doth also to me:
 Yet will I not for this saye she is faire,
 Seeing in her that, there is no bewtie:
 Nor yet into her body large and bigge,
 A whit of grace or any pleasauntnes.
 Faire Lesbia in bewtie doth exceede,
 And from the rest hath stolen all pleasant grace.

CAP. XXVI.

Of the distribution from the effect.

The distribution from the effecte is when the partes are effectes, as in the similitude of Cato, wherein he sheweth them to haue erred that sayde, olde men dyd nothing. Those (sayeth he) that affirmeth olde men constitute ouerseers of the common wealth to do nothing, sayeth as much as if they should say the Gouvernour of the shippe doth nothing, when some of the Moryners clymeth the mast, others ronne the hatches up and downe,
 some

*Some doe make the pompe emptie the Goner-
nour in the hynder parte of the shippe guideth
the rudder and sterne. Here the distribution
of the generall argument into the speciall
doth excell. The generall is the whole, of
one essence with his partes: The speciall of
kinde is a parte of the generall, as *Animal*,
a living thing is the whole, whose essence
or definition, (to wit, a corporall substance
hauing life and senses) doth alike appar-
taine to men and beastes, which are the spe-
cialls contained as partes vnder the gene-
rall *animal*. So is *Man* the generall to
single men, and a lion to single lions: and
again single men are the specialls of man,
and single lions, of the lion. The generall
argument is either chiefe generall or subal-
ternall. The speciall argument is either
subalternall or most speciall. The chiefe ge-
nerall is that which hath nothing above it
more generall as in our diuision set forth in
the first chapter, the argument is chiefe ge-
nerall of argumentes artificiall, and of the
inartificiall: The most speciall which might
not be deuised into other inferiours was
the matter and the forme. The subalternall
which may be the general in respect of one,*

and speciall in respect of another as the cause contained vnder the artificiall argument, as a speciall, and was generall to the matter and forme which it did containe vnder it selfe. The generall and the speciall are notes and signes of the causes and the effectes. For the generall containeth the cause which doth equally appertaine to his specialls: and againe the speciall containeth the effect of their generall. This is the reason wherfoze the vniuersall excelleth in dignitie, by reason it containeth the cause, as, ouid in his Metamorph. deuiceth the generall, to wit, a lyuing thing into his specialls, as starres (to the which he giueth a life, as the philosophers doe) fowles, beastes, fish, and men: as,

That no kinde, place, or region shoulde be,
Of liuing thinges left voide or else emptie:
The Gods doe make their habitation,
Among the starres, into the high Region,
The scalie fish also, by lotte and keuill,
The floudde cleare obtained therein to dwell:
The earth receiued the beastes fierce and wilde,
The easie sturred aire, the flying foule:
But yet the lyuing thing, which doth these all excel,
In holynesse, and eke more capable:
Matters diuine in minde for to conceaue,

Was

Was not present, the rest in guide to haue.

Therefore at last was man bozne, &c. So, Cicero, in his first booke of his Offices deuioeth vertue, into fower speciall kindes: **Wisdom**e, **Iustice**, **Fortitude**, and **Temperance**. All thinges (sayeth he) that are honest, doth rise of one of these fower partes, either it consisteth in the perfect knowledge of the truth and quicknesse of wit, or in the defending of the societie and fellowshippe of man, by geuing to euerie man his right, and fulfilling of thinges promysed: Or in the noble courage and strength of a valiant and mighty spirit: Or last in obseruing a good maner and order in all thinges, either done or sayed, in the which modestie and temperancie consisteth.

Sometime we argue or reason from the generall to the speciall: as, All men maye marrie who haue not the giste of Chastitie, ergo, Priestes and Ministers maye marrie. And contrarie from the speciall to the generall in a parte: as, Abraham was iustified by faith, therefore man maye be iustified by faith.

CAP. XXVII.

Of the distribution from the Subiect.

Now followeth the distribution of those that after a certaine fashion doth agree: as of the Subject and the adioynt. The distribution is saide to be of the subject, when the partes are Subiectes: as. The twelue Tribes of Israell had the land of Canaan, which was a subiect parted amonge them, vnto the Rubenites the plaine of Medeba, &c. vnto the Gaddes, Iazer and Gylad, &c. vnto Manasses the kingdome of Og, &c. vnto Iuda was geuen the wildernesse of Zin, &c. vnto Ephraim from Ierico to the wildernesse. &c. vnto Benjamin from Iordan up the side of Ierico on the north part, &c. vnto Simeon was geuen Beersheba Sheba and Moladah, &c. vnto Zabulon from Sarid eastward vnto Chisloth, &c. vnto Issachar Izreelah Chesulleth and Shunen, &c. vnto Assur. Nephtali, and Dan euerie one his porcion: as is described the 13. 15. 16. 18. and 19. Chapiters of Iosua. Cicero 5. Tuscul. There be thre sorts of goodes, Goodes partaining to the bodie: goodes partaining to the soule, and external goodes. He who doth attaine the heauenly goodes partaining to the soule, is rather to be named most blessed, then blessed.

CAP.

CAP. XXVIII.

*Of the distribution taken from
the adiointe*

The distribution from the adiointe is :
when the partes and members of the
distribution are adioyntes : as *Of men some
be whole, some sicke, some rich, some poore.* So
Virgill I. of his *Georgickes*, parteth the
worlde after the adioyntes into five par-
tes, whereof the middle is parching hotte,
the two extremities colde, and the rest tem-
perate.

Circles there be which part the firmament,
In number five, whereof is one ardente,
With the hotte beame of glittering sunne and fier,
About the which an other doth appeare
On euery side with frosen yce congeled
And stormes blacke: eke those there doth deuide
Two other, which doth holde the midde region
Graunted to penfue men for habitation.
By gift of God.

Cesar the first booke of French warres.
Gallia (now called *Fraunce*) is parted into
three partes, wherof the people called *Belgi*, do
holde one: *Aquitani* an other parte, and *Cel-*
ti the third part.

The definition is an *Oratio* which both clearly declare what the thing is, The definition is either perfect and called properly definition, or vnperfect and called description. The perfect definition is a definition which consisteth of the sole causes that accomplished the substance of the thing defined. Such as be the generall argument and the speciall or forme. So man is defined a reasonable lving thing: Here (by lving thing) which is the generall argument, we vnderstande, a corporall substance partaker of life and sence, which is the matter of man and parte of the forme: vnto the which, if ye will put to (reasonable) ye shall comprehend the whole forme of man: So that the perfect definition is nothing else but a collection of the causes which doe constitute and performe the substance and nature of the thing defined: such as be the definition of Artes. Grammer an Art which teacheth to speake well and congruously. Rethoricke eloquently: Dialecticke, an Art which teacheth to dispute well: Gometricke, to Measure well.

CAP.

The description is a definition which defineth the thing not onely with the causes, but with other argumentes also: as, *a Man is a reasonable thing mortall, and apte to learne*: Here with the cause are ioynted both the common and proper adioynt. This compendious and shorte briefnes is not alwayes to be founde in this sort of argument, but desireth sometime to haue a moze excellent and magnificall explication: as *Glorie*, is described by *Cicero* in his oration for *Milo*, yet of all the rewards of vertue, if there were a respect to be had of rewards, I iudge glorie to be the most greate, which onely doth comfort the shortnes of this life with the memorie of the posteritie to come, which doth make vs when we be absent to be as present, and when we be dead doth make vs to liue. And likewise fame is that, by whose occasion and meane, men seeme to ascende and mount vp to the heauens aboue. So fame is described by *Virgill* 4. *Eneid*os.

Anone through all the Cities great,

of Afflicke fame is gone:

The blasing fame a mischief suche,

as swifter there is none.

By mouing more, she breades, and as.
 She ronnes, her might doth ryse:
 By lowe for feare she lurkerh first,
 Then straight alofte in Skyes,
 With pryde on grounde she goeth, and percheth
 The clowdes with heade on hight:
 Dame earthe her mother brooded furthe
 (Men saye) that childe in spight:
 Against the Gods, when Gyantes first,
 Of Serpentes feeted lyne:
ENCELADVS & CEVS wrought
 Hye heaueus to vnder mine
 Then for disdayne, (for on them selues
 Their owne worke loue did sling)
 Their Sister crauled furthe bothe swyfte,
 Of feete and wight of wing
 A Monster gastly greare for euery
 Plume her Carcas beares:
 Lyke nomber leering eyes she hathe,
 Lyke nomber harkening eares,
 Lyke nomber tongues and mouthes she wagges,
 A Wondrous thing to speake:
 At mydnyght furthe she flyes and dothe
 Vnder shade her sounde squeake.
 All night she wakes, nor slomber swete,
 Dothe take, nor neuer slepes:
 By dayes on howses toppes she syttes.
 Or gates of Townes she keepes:
 On watching toures she clymes, and the
 Great cities makes agast.
 Both truth and falshod forth she telles
 And lyes abrode doth cast.
 Such be the descriptions of planets, and
 beastes

beastes in naturall things: Of flowers,
mountaines, and townes in geographi-
call and histori- call.

CAP. XXXI.

*Of diuine testimonie: The first sorte of the
vnartificiall argumente.*

THe artificiall argumente being expoun-
ded followeth consequently the vnartifi-
ciall. The argumente vnartificiall or with-
out arte is an argumente which proueth or
disproueth not of his owne nature, but by
the strength which it hath of some argument
artificiall. And therefore when the matter
is deepe-ly considered, it hath but a litle
strength to proue or disproue. In ciuill and
temporall affaires, the authoritie of the dis-
puter geueth no litle credite thereunto if he
be wise, vertuous, and haue the beneuolence
of the auditours: all these by one name may
be called a testimonie. The Testimonie is
parted into a diuine & humaine. Amongest
diuine and spirituall testimonies are num-
bered not onely the Oracles of the Goddes,
but also the answers of prophetes and de-
uinours: as Cicero the third for Catiline.
And to omitte (sayeth the Orator) the light-

ning torches which did appeare by night in the Occident, the vehement and parching heats of the heauens: as thrames of lightnings, and fier breaking out of the cloudes, earthquakes, and many other such tempestes, which (I being Conſull) did appeare, ſo that the Goddes with a loude voice ſeamed to ſinge thoſe thinges which be now preſent. And a litle after, he ſayeth: At the which time when out of all Hetruria the Saunſayers being gathered together, concluded that greate ſlaughter and burning did approche, the deſtruction of the lawes, both ciuill and domeſticall warres, and the utter ruine of the whole towne and impire: without the immortal Goddes by all meanes appeaſed had by their diuine power, chaunged almoſt the very fatall neceſſitie. *Tibullus.*

If that in holy Church the oracles,
Doth tell the truth, on my name tell her this,
Appollo Delius doth ſure to the promiſe,
An happy mariage: therefore if thou be wiſe,
Keepe well thy ſelfe, ſecke not the companie,
Of other men, for that is not Godly.

CAP. XXXII.

Of humaine teſtimonie.

The teſtimonie humaine is eyther general or ſingular. General, as the lawe,
AND

and famous sayings. There is an example of the lawe, both written and unwritten in the Oracion of Cicero for Milo: as, *There is a lawe* (honorab!e Iudges) *not written, but naturally spronge up which we haue not learned, read, nor receaued of others, but taken, receaued and drawn from nature it selfe, the which so attaine, we are not taught, but made: not instructed by other, but taught by nature.* To witte, That if our life should fall into an ambushe or cōspiracie, into the power and weapons, either of robbers, or of our enemies, that we should by all honest meanes, deliuer our selues from all daunger. And a litle after. *If the tables would a sheefe taken in the night to be killed by any meanes, and a sheefe taken in the daye (if he by weapon defended him selfe) to be killed also without daunger: who is he that thinke the Slaughtier to be punished, howsoeuer it be committed; seeing he may perceiue, that the very lawes them selues: do offer to vs sometime the sworde to kill men.* Proverbes are numbred amongst famous sentences: as *Like draweth to like.* The sayings also of wisemen: as, *Know thy selfe. Mediocritie is best of all things.* There is an example of the singular testimonie. Cicero 1. ad Fratres.

*And surely that prince of ingenie and knowledge Plato, had this opinion that the common wealthes should then be most happie and blessed, when that either learned and wise men began to gouerne them: Or that those who had the care ouer them, should giue them selues to wisdom and knowledge. So Christ himselfe, the Apostles, and Euangelistes do confirme their doctrine, by the lawe of Moses: The Physicians, by the authoritie of Hippocrates, Dioscorides, Galen, and such others: the Philosophers, by Plato and Aristotle: the Lawyers, by Iustinian: and the Mathematicians, by Euclides. So when there riseth any question of controuersie of landes or slaughter and such other matters, we vse to produce their obligations, and binde them with their confession and othe, we haue an example of Obligation, of Cicero, in 5. Philippicke. Yea I shall be bolde to binde my sayth to you (beloued Iudges) and to the people Romaine, which if nothing compelled me I would not take in hande but would very much feare (in a most dangerous matter) the fame and suspicion of rashenes. I promise, I undertake, I binde my selfe (honorable Iudges) that Caesar shalbe at all times
such*

such a Citizen as he is this daye; and such a one as you ought to wishe and desire him to be. We maye comprehend vnder the name of obligations, gages geuen for the suertie of any thing: as, Virgill 3. of Egloges. A herdsman hauing no artificiall argumente to proue that he could singe better then his fellow, braggeth that he will laye downe an heifer for a gage. The confession is either voluntarie, or forced. Voluntarie, when we do graunte any thing of our owne will. Forced, when by tormentes we are compelled to graunt that which otherwayes we would not, and is properly called a question. What does enemye vseth such an argumēt against him, but it is mocked of Cicero: Go too I praye you (sayeth Cicero) what was the question, or after what fashio? ho?, hoe? where is Rusbio? where is Casca? hath Clodius wrought treason against Milo? he hath wrought: then a certaine Gibbet for him. He hath wrought none, then there is a hope of his libertie. Hereto also maye be referred the sorte of argumente which we vse, when we do offer to proue our sayinges by expertence: as Cicero 4. of Terron. Is there any bodie that would haue geuen to Volcatius (although he

commeth of him selfe) the tenth parte of a
 denier? Let him come now and see: there is no
 man that will receaue him within his house.
Terence in Eunucho. Examina in knowledge
 and learning, in wrestling and fighting at the
 barriers. I shall geue you one cunningly lear-
 ned in all things, which is decent for a gentle-
 man to haue. An Obe is also numbered
 amongst the testimonies: as, **Vergill 6.**
Geneios.

I was the cause of death, alas,
 Now by the starres I liue:
 By all the Goddess, and as there be,
 Remayning yet one where
 Vnfained faith, if truth on ground
 Or vnder ground maye be
 Against my will (O Quene) from thy
 Dominions did I flye.

F I N I S.

THE



THE
SECOND BOOKE
OF DIALECTICKE,
containing the disposition.

CAP. I.

*Of the definition and denifion, of the
disposition and proposition.*



We haue intreated in the former booke the first parte of Dialecticke, which is inuention: Nowe followeth consequently the other parte, which we did name Iudgement and disposition. Disposition is a parte of Dialecticke, which teacheth to dispoſe and place orderly the argumentes inuented, to the ende we maye iudge well and rightely: for we iudge of every thing according to the disposition thereof. And therefore this parte of Logicke is eyther called iudgement or disposition vnder one ſignification. Disposition is parted into the Proposition (other wiſe called Enunſiation) or Sprogſime and Perſode. Proposition is a diſpoſition in the

which one argumente is spoken for an other. The proposition hath two partes, the first is called the antecedent, the seconde the consequent: Of the which the qualities of propositions doe rise. And first the affirmation and the negation. The proposition affirmatine, is when the consequent affirmeth vpon the antecedent: as, a man is mortall. The proposition is negatiue, when the consequent denieth vpon the antecedent: as, Man is not mortall: and here riseth the contradiction of propositions, when one consequent both both affirme and denie vpon one antecedent.

C A P. I I.

Of the true proposition and false, contingent, necessarie, and impossible, and of the three documentes of artes.

The proposition is either true or false. It is true when the consequent is truly ioined with the antecedent, or truly separated from the same: as here it is truly ioined: all men are sinners: and here truly separated: no man is iust. The proposition is called contingent, when the consequent be truly said of the antecedent, so that sometime it maye

may be false: as fortune helpeth hardie men, for graunting it to be true to daue, it may be false to morrowe: So that the veritie of this sort of positions is onely certaine in thinges present or past, and not in thinges to come. The proposition is necessarie whe the consequent may at all times truely be saide of the antecedent: as, all men are mortall. And contrariwise, the proposition impossible, is when the consequent may at no time be saide of the antecedent: as, A man is a boxe. The necessarie is either of one kinde, or of a diuerse kinde. The necessarie of one kinde is when the partes are coessentiall among them selues, as when the generall is saide of the speciall: as, A man is a liuing thing, or the differēce of the forme, as, a man is reasonable, or the adioincte of his proper subiecte, as, A man may laughe. And this sorte of proposition is sometime reciprocate, when the consequent, not onely may be saide alwaye of the antecedent, and of all thinges contained vnder the antecedent, but of it selfe also, so that the antecedent contrariwise may be saide of the consequent, on the same maner: as Man is a reasonable liuing thing, number is equall

or bnequall. The proposition of diuerse kinde, is when the partes are not coessentiall: as, A man is blacke or white. And here we haue three generall documentes to be obserued in all artes and sciences. The first is that all the pceptes and rules should be generall and of necessitie true: and this is called a document of veritie. The seconde that euerie arte be contained within his owne boundes, and withholde nothing appertaining to other artes, and is named a document of iustice. The third, that euerie thing be taught according to his nature, that is: generall things, generally: and particular, particularly: and this is called a document of wisdome.

CAP. III.

Of the simple proposition.

The proposition is either simple or compounde. The simple with the which a simple saying is declared: and therefore it containeth a simple consequent: which if it doe affirme, maketh the whole to affirme, and contrariwise, if it denieth, the whole denieth: as, fier burneth, fier is hotte, fier is not

water. Here, burneth, hotte, and water, are the simple consequentes: vpon the affirmation or negation of the which dependeth the affirmation or negation of the whole. And this is the first disposition of things inuented, when the cause is ioyned with the effecte, as in the first example. Or the subiecte with the adiointe as in the second: Or the disagreeable, with the disagreeable, as in the thirde. After the which manner all sortes of argumentes may be pronounced (except full comparisons and distributions) the agreeable by affirming, and the disagreeable by denying.

The simple proposition is either generall or speciall. Generall, when it speaketh generally. And here the one parte of the contradiction is not alwayes true, and the other false. For in thinges contingent they may be both false: as, All men are learned: No man is learned. And in thinges also which be not contingent: as, All lyuing thinges are reasonable. No lyuing thing is reasonable. The proposition is speciall, when it speaketh specially and of a parte. And here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other false. The speciall is either

Indefinite, or proper : Indefinite when it speaketh of no certaine thing: as, Some mā is learned, whose generall contradiction is No man is learned. Proper when the consequent is saide of some proper name: as, Fabella is fayre, whose contradiction is, Fabella is not fayre.

CAP. IIII.

Of the proposition compoude,

The proposition compoude is when moe sayinges then one are toynd together by some coniunction. And therfore vpon the affirmation or negation of the coniunction, dependeth the affirmation of the whole proposition: and here the one parte of the contradiction is true, and the other is false. The compoude proposition is either congregative or segregative: The proposition is congregative, when the coniunction gathereth, and is either copulative or connexive. Copulative, when the coniunction is copulative, as. Both *Enrius* and *Africus* rush forth. Whose negation and contradiction, is, not both *Enrius* and *Africus* rush forth. And here is to be noted, that the veritie of the proposition

proposition copulatiue dependeth vpon the veritie of both parts: for if one part be false, the whole is saide to be false, as in this example. Both man and beast are reasonable, the whole proposition is false, because the last part is false. Hereto may be referred the proposition containing the relation of qualities, in the which the relation standeth in place of the coniunction: as.

Such thing as sleepe, and rest on grasse

To wearie men appeares

The same to me of thy swete verse

The melodie so cleare

As though he woulde say sleepe is swete
to weary men, so is thy verse to me. Whose
negation is,

Not that which sleepe, and rest on grasse,

To wearie men appeares

The same to me of thy swete verse.

The melodie so cleare.

CAP. V.

Of the proposition conuexiue

The proposition is conuexiue, whose conjunction is conuexiue: as, if thou haue faith, thou must haue charitie: Whose negation is, not althoughe thou haue faith, it foloweth that thou must haue charitie.

Cicero de fratre. Neither if a proposition be true or false, by and by it followeth that causes are immutable. The affirmation signifieth that if the antecedent be, the consequent must be also. The negation or contradiction signifieth, that although the antecedent be, the consequent must not be therefore. Whereby we must understande, that whensoever this sorte of proposition is true, it must be necessarie also. The necessitie is knownen by the necessarie connexion of the partes, & not by the veritie of the same: for both the partes may be false, and the connexion necessarie, as this: if a man be an horse, he hath lower feete, is a necessary connexion. But if the connexion be contingent, and only for his probabilitie supposed to be, there ariseth no necessarie iudgement, but onely opinion: as, Terence in andria. If thou doe that (Pamphile) this is the last daye that euer thou shalt see me. The proposition containing the relation of time is hitherto referred: as, when Justice is maintained, then shall peace be in the Realme.

CAP. VI.

Of the proposition segregative.

The

The proposition segregatiue is, whose coniunction dothe segregate: and therefore it speaketh only of disagreeable arguments. It is parted into discerning propositions and vniouning. The discerning is, whose coniunction dothe discern. Cicero in Tusc. 3. *Although that by the sense of the bodie, they be Iudged, yet they are to be referred to the spirit: whose negation and contradiction is, Not although that by the sense of the bodie they be iudged, they are therefore to be referred to the spirit.* This sort of proposition is true, when both the partes is true & discerned also. Otherwise it is false and ridiculous.

CAP. VII.

Of the proposition vniouning.

The proposition vniouning, is a proposition segregated, whose coniunction doth vnioune. as, either it is night or day: all liuing things, are either man or beast: whose negations are, It is not either day or night: all liuing things are not either man or beast: Here the negation declareth, that the one parte or the other is not true of necessitie. For if the disiunction be abso-

lutely true, it is also necessarie, and the partes opposed immediatly one to other. Yet although the true disjunction be necessarie also, it is not required that the partes separated be necessarie: as, This is a necessarie disjunction: A man is either good or not good: and yet this (A man is good) is not necessarie: Nor this, (a man is not good) But the necessitie of the disjunction dependeth vpon the necessarie opposition and disjunction of the partes, and not of their necessary veritie. The disjunction is sometimes with a condition, as if one shoulde aske, whether is Cleon, or Socrates come? because it was so promised that the one shoulde onely come. And therefore if the disjunction be contingent, it is not absolutely true, but onely opinable, such as oftentimes we vse in common speaking: as, Ouid in Leanders epistle.

Either happie courage shall saue me,
Or death of careful life the ende shalbe.

CAP. VIII.

Of the Sillogisme.

A Sillogisme is a disposition the which the question being disposed with the argument

mente is necessarily infered in the conclusiō:
 For if the propositiō be doubtfull, it is made
 a question: And to proue the question, we
 take an argument, & dispone it with the que-
 stion. The Sillogisme hath two partes:
 one which goeth befoze, another that fol-
 loweth, and may be called, the antecedent
 and the consequent. The antecedent which
 proueth or disproueth the questiō, and hath
 two partes: the proposition and assump-
 tiō, otherwise called the *Paioz* and the *Di-
 noz*. The proposition is the first parte of the
 antecedent, in the which the whole question
 or the consequent of the question is disposed
 with the argument. The assumption is the
 2. parte of the antecedent, which is assumed
 vnder the proposition. The consequent is
 the last parte of the Sillogisme, which con-
 taineth the partes of the question, and con-
 cludeth the same, and therefore it is called
 the Conclusion: if any of those partes be
 absent, it is called a mutiler Sillogisme, or
Enymema) if any thing be moze then those
 three partes, it is called a *Prosillogisme*.
 Sometime also the order is confounded:
 therefore if any doubt shall rise through
 any of these things, it is good to put to that

¶

which is absent, and pull away that which aboundeth, and last to put every thing in his owne place.

C A P. I X.

Of the first forme.

A Sillogisme is either simple or compound. Simple when the partes of the question are disposed with the argumente, so that the consequent be in the proposition and the antecedent in the assumption. The Sillogisme is affirmant, when the proposition and assumption affirmeth: And negant, when either the one or the other is negant. Generall, when they are both generall: Speciall, when there is but one generall: Proper, when they are both proper. The simple Sillogisme is either mutilate or whole. Mutilate, when the conclusion is brought in after on proposition or on assumption: as,

All men be sinners,

Ergo Socrates.

And

Socrates is a man,

Ergo he is a sinner.

The simple Sillogisme is of two sortes: first the argumente onely goeth before, or followeth

loweth onely. The first sorte then of this kinde is, when the argument going before in the proposition sometime affirmatiuely and sometime negatiuely, and in the assumption onely affirmatiuely infereth a speciall conclusion: as, in the examples following.

Affirmant generall, as,

Constancie is a vertue:

But Constancie is Confidence:

Therefore some Confidence is vertue:

Negant generall, as,

Foolishhardnesse is no vertue:

But foolishhardnesse is Confidence:

Some Confidence therefore is no vertue:

Affirmant speciall, as,

A wiseman is to be praised:

But some wiseman is a poore man:

Therefore some poore man is to be praised.

Negant speciall, as,

A foole is not alwayes happy:

But some foole is fortunate:

Therefore some fortunate is not alwayes happy:

Affirmant proper, as,

Socrates is a Philosopher:

But Socrates is a man:

Therefore some man is a Philosopher.

Negant proper, as.

Thersites is no Philosopher:

But Therſites is a man,
Some man therefore is no Philoſopher.

But here, in common ſpeaking to the ende
we maye iudge the moze eaſly, we uſe to diſ-
poſe thus :

Some Confidence is a vertue, as Conſtancie:
Some is not, as, fooliſh hardyneſſe.

C A P. X.

Of the ſecond forme.

THe ſecond ſozme is, when the argument
being conſequent affirmatiuely in the
propoſition or aſſumption, in the propoſi-
tion definitely : the concluſion is brought in
like to the antecedent : as,

Generall. 1.

The troubled man, reaſoneth not well,
The wiſeman reaſoneth well:
The wiſeman therefore is not troubled.

And Cicero in 3. Tuſcul. *As the eye (ſayeth
he) being troubled, is not able to ſatueſie his
office verie well: and the reſt of the partes, yea
the whole bodie being moued out of his good
ſtate, is not able to perſorme his office: enē ſo the
ſpirite being troubled is not well diſpoſed to e-
xecute his dewtie wel and wiſely, and the dew-
tie of the ſpirite is, to uſe reaſon: but the wiſe*

man

man his spirite is alwayes so disposed that it
maye most perfectly vse reason, and therefore
he is neuer troubled.

Generall 2. as.

Mortall thinges are compounde,
The spirite or soule is not compounde:
The soule therefore is not mortall.

**As Cicero Tuscul. 1. proueth the immorta-
litie of the soule by this Syllogisme.**

*In the knowledge (sayeth he) of mans soule
we maye not doubt (without we be most dull
and ignorant in naturall thinges.) But there
is nothing admixt with the soule, nothing com-
pacte or made of elementes, nothing compounde
or double: Which, if it be so, surely it maye
neither be put asunder nor deuided, nor torne,
nor pluckt in peeces. For death is nothing els
but the departing, separating and deuision of
those partes, which before death were coupled
together by some copulation.*

Speciall 1. as.

The enuyous is not valiant,
Maximius is valiant:
Maximius therefore is not enuyous.

As Duide in Elegia 3. both conclude,
Ill will and spite full slouthfull vices be,
And neuer doth to gentle maners tende,
And as the lurking viper full lowly,

Dothe alway creepe out through the lowest
ground.

But (Maxime) thy spirite is valiant

And doth about thy linage reche I winne,

But yet although thy name be great I grant

It doth no way excell thy swifte engeinne.

Therefore let others ouerthrow the innocent,

And let them wishe that all men should them
feare,

Eke let them beare their dartes about the point,

Well died with byting venom thining cleare:

But (MAXIME) thy house and familie,

Is well accustomed all prostrate for to amende,

Among the which I pray the hartefully,

To number me, and so I make an ende.

Speciall 2. as,

A daunser is Riotous:

Murena is not Riotous:

Murena therefore is no daunser.

Which Cicero for Murena, hath vnder
this forme. *Almost no sober man without he
be madde doth leape either when he is alone,
or yet among a moderate and honest companie:
for immoderate daunsing is the companion &
follower of inordinate banketing, pleasant and
delectable places, and shortly of all delites, and
pleasant phantasies. But thou captiously takest
that which most needeth be the extreme of all
vice: and yet unawares leamest those thinges,
without the which that vice is not to be found,*
for

for thou shewest no filthy banquetting, no inopportunate lone, no feasting: no lone of bodye: neither any extraordinarie expences. And seeing those things be not to be founde, what maye these wordes, voluptuousnesse or sensuallitie signifie and those things which be vices? Beleeuest thou to finde the vंबर and shade of riotousnesse in that in the which thou canst not finde riotousnesse it selfe.

Proper 1. as,

Agessilaus is not painted of Apelles;
Alexander is painted of Apelles;
Alexander therfore is not Agessilaus.

Proper 2. as,

Cæsar oppresseth his natie countrey;
Tullius oppresseth not his natie countreya;
Tullius therfore is not Cæsar,

C A P. XI.

Of the seconde kinde of Sillogisme.

WE haue hitherto expounded the two sortes of the first kinde of the simple Sillogisme: Now followeth the second. The simple Sillogisme of the second kinde is, when the argument definitely going before in the proposition, and following affirmatiuely in the assumption, the conclusion is brought in like to the antecedent.

¶ iiiij

Affirmant generall.

That which is iust, is profitable,

But that which is honest, is iust,

Therefore that which is honest is profitable:

Which Cicero 2. Offic. concludeth thus.

The Philosophers of greatest authoritie, yet very sharply and honestly haue by cogitation distinguished these three, which be confused. For whatsoeuer is iust, that also they esteeme to be profitable: and that which is honest, the same to be iust: Of the which it is concluded, that whatsoeuer thing is honest, the same to be profitable.

Negant generall.

That thing which is voide of all Counsell, cannot be gouerned by Counsell.

But loue is voide of all Counsell;

Loue therfore cannot be gouerned by any Counsell.

As Terence sayeth in his Eunuche almost vnder the same forme.

Affirmant speciall.

These Consulls which for their vertue are chosen, ought diligētly to defende the cōmō wealth; Cicero is chosen Consull for his vertue: Cicero therefore ought diligently to defende the common wealth. So the Orator 2. Agrar. concludeth his owne diligence and care: For seeing all Consulls ought to haue a greate care
and

and diligence in keeping of the common wealth: Those ought most chiefly so to do, who not from their youth, but in open place are chosen consuls. My predecessors made no suretie to the people Romaine for me: They beleened my selfe: It is your dutie to aske of me that thing which mine office requireth, and to call mine owne selfe to iudgement. For as when I sued for this office, none of my predecessors commended me vnto you: Ene so if I offend in any thing, there is no shifte that may deliuer me fro you: wherefore, if God prolong my dayes (although I am the man who is able to defende the same from their mischenous & subtile conspiracies) this I promise vnto you Quirites, that ye haue geuen the charg of your common wealth vnto a vigilant man, & no fearefull fellow: To a diligent man, and no Coward or feintharted.

Negant speciall.

He that deceiueth a louing maide is not to be praised:

Demophon is a deceiuer of a louing maide, as Phillidis:

Demophon therefore is not to be praised.

Phillis thus inferreth in Dinde.

For to deceaue a maide of tender age,
Which trusteth in thee, it is no vassalage,
Nor crasue glorie: For her simplicitie,

Had rather haue the constant loue of thee.
 I Phillis both a loue and a maide,
 Am by thy wordes (false Demophon) deceaued:
 God graunt therfore which dwells in heauens hie.
 For thy deceit that thou rewarded be.

Affirmant proper.

Octavius was Cæsars heire:
 I am Octavius:
 I am therefore Cæsars heire.

Negant proper.

Antonius is not Cæsars sonne:
 Thou art Antonius:
 Thou art not therefore Cæsars sonne.

CAP. XII.

Of the compounde Sillogisme.

AS yet we haue intreated of the simple Sillogisme: Now followeth the compounde: The compounde Sillogisme is, when the whole question is the one parte of the proposition affirmant and compounde, and the argument the other parte. But the argument is sometime consequent to the antecedent of the question, and sometime it is the other whole parte of the proposition: and then it is onely assumed in the assumption. The compounde sillogisme is either ioynded or disioynded. The sillogisme ioynded is a compounde sillogisme, whose
 proposition

proposition is ioyned with this conjunction, if, and such others, and is of two sortes: The first affirmeth the antecedent, and concludeth the consequent, as Cicero concludeth. 2. *Diuinae.*

If there be Gods, there is a diuination:

But there are Gods.

Ergo there is a diuination.

Cicer. 3. offic. Surely if nature prescribe that man should wish the commoditie and furtheraunce of man, whatsoeuer he be for that he is man, of necessitie it is required according to the selfe same nature, that the vtilitie and profite of all be common: Which if it be so, we are contained all vnder one lawe of nature: And if this be also, truely we are forbidden by the lawe of nature, that one shoulde misuse another. But the first is true, therefore the last is true. Here often times the same is not assumed, but some thing greater. 1. *Catal.* If thy parents shoulde feare thee & hate thee, so that thou couldst by no meanes appease the, I beleue that thou wouldest get thee some way out of their sight. Nowe thy natine countrie which is the mother of vs all, both hateth and feareth thee, and knoweth that thou thinkest nothing but her destruction and ruine: Shalt thou neither feare her auctoritie, neither shalt

thou followe her Iudgement, neither shalt thou be afraied of her mightie power? The same soze of concluding is, when the proposition containeth a relation of time, as Oenone concludeth her error of foolishnesse.

*When Paris may without Oenone be,
Then Xanthus shall run backwarde vp the vale:
Turne Xanthus, turne, run fluddes backwardly.
For Paris dorth without Oenone dwell.*

The second soze of toynd Syllogisme pulleth away the consequent, that it may pull atop the antecedent also.

*If a man were immortall, he would be a simple substance, without composition of elementes:
But he is neuer without the mixture of elementes.
He is neuer therefore immortall*

*Alexander the great asking one of his wise men by what meanes a man might be God:
If (saide the wiseman) he shall doe those thinges which a man is not able to doe.*

*Of the which answere I make this syllogis.
If a man would be God, he must doe that which is impossible for man to do:*

*But the consequent cannot be:
Nor yet the antecedent therefore*

CAP. XIII.

Of the disioined syllogisme.

The disioined syllogisme is a compounde syllogisme, whose proposition is disioined:

ned: And is of two sortes: The first taketh away the one, and concludeth the other: as,

It is either night or day:

But it is not day:

It is night therefore.

Cicero for Cluentio *But when this choise was offered to him that either he should unjustly and godly accuse, or die cruellie and unworthely: he choseth rather to accuse howsoever he might, then to haue dyed after that sorte: as he would say.*

Either he must accuse or die:

He will not die:

He will accuse therefore.

The second sort of disioined illogisme taketh one in the proposition for the most part affirmant, and pulleth away the rest: as,

It is either night or day:

It is day:

It is not night therefore.

And sometime the proposition negant, after this forme.

It is not both night and daye:

But it is daye:

It is not night therefore.

CAP. XIII.

Of the methode.

The method is a disposition by the which among many propositions of one sorte, and by their disposition knownen, that thing which is absolutely most cleare is first placed, and secondly that which is next : and therefore it continually proceedeth from the most generall to the speciall and singuler. By this methode we procede from the antecedent moze absolutely knownen to proue the consequent, which is not so manifestly knownen: and this is the only method, which Aristotle did obserue.

CAP. XV.

*Of the illustration of the methode by
examples of artes.*

The chiefe examples of the methode are found in artes & sciences : in the which although the rules be all generall, yet they are distinct by thre degrees: for euerie thing as it is moze generall is first placed. The most generall therefore shalbe first placed: then next shall follow these which be immediately cōtained vnder the general, euerie one orderly vnto the most speciall which shalbe last disposed. The definition therefore as most generall, shalbe first placed: next fol-
loweth

loweth the distribution, which if it be manifest, and of diuerse sortes shalbe first diuided into his integrall partes, next into his formes and kindes. And euery part & forme shalbe placed and described in the same order and place which he had in his diuision. It shalbe expedient also if the prolix declaration part them farre a sonder, to geather them by a short transition, for that doth recreate and refresh the auditor. But that the matter may be the more easily understood we must vse some familiar example. If you will aske (hauing all the definitions, diuisions, and rules of Grammer written in diuerse tables, and mixt out of all order) what part of dialecticke teacheth the to dispone orderly these rules so confounded, first thou hast no neede of the places of inuention, seeing they be all readie found out: neither hast thou neede of the first disposition of propositions, seeing they are disponed all ready: neither of the second disposition, which is the iudgement of the syllogisme, seeing all thinges which might fall into controuersie is proued and concluded: onely the methode doth remaine. The Logitian therefore by the light of this artificiall methode, shall

take a part out of this confused masse the definition (for it is most generall) and place it first of all: As grammer is an art which teacheth to speake well and cōgruſly. Then shall he ſeeke out of the ſaid maſſe the diuiſion of grammer, and ſhall diſpone the ſame in the ſecond place: Grammer is parted into two partes, Etimologie, and ſyntax. And thereafter he ſhall finde out the definition of Etimologie, to the which he ſhall glue the third place. Then he ſhall ſeeke out the partes of the Etimologie, and firſt the moſt generall as letters: next ſyllabs and wordes. Having the partes, he muſt ſeeke the formes: as wordes hauing number, & without number. And laſt he ſhall knit and ioyne together with ſhozte & apt tranſitiones the end of euerie declaratiō with the beginning of the next. And ſo hauing defined, deuided & knit together the partes of the Etimologie, he ſhall make euery thing moze manifeſt and plaine with moſt fit and ſpeciall examples. And after the ſame order he ſhall increate the ſyntax. This is a generall methode obſerued in all artes.

C AP.

CAP. XVI.

*Of the illustration of the methode by exam-
ples, of Poetes, Orators, and
Historiographers.*

WE do not only vse this methode in the declaration of artes and sciences, but in the expounding of all thinges which we woulde plainely set forth. And therefore the poetes, orators and all sort of writers how oft soener they purpose to teach there auditors, doe alwayes follow this order of methode, although they do not euery where insiste therein. Virg. in his Georgickes parted his matter as we haue sayd into fouer partes: for in the first booke he intreateth of common and generall thinges, as of Astrologie, and thinges engendred in the ayre, and of cornes and there manuring, which is the first parte of his worke: then he useth a litle transition in the beginning of the second booke.

This much is spoke of starres and husbanding:
Now will I thee Bacche begin to sing.

Here he writeth generally of trees, then specially of vines: the second transition is put in the third parte, but more imperfect, and without the conclusion of the third

booke, of oxen, horse, sheepe and dogges:

Eke thee great Pales the Goddes of pasture:
And thee Apollo of sheepe the gouernour,
At Amphyfius with praises I will sing.

And last the third transitiō of the fowrth part
is put in the beginning of the fowrth booke:

Now by and by with songe I will you shewe.
Thuplandith gistes of hony made of dewe.

Here wherefore we maye see that the Poet
hath studied to place the most generall in
the first place, and the next generall in the
middlest, and the most speciall last of all. So
doth Quide in his lastes first propone the
somme of his worke, and shortly after parte
the same: & last hauing declared the partes,
knitteth them together with short transi-
tions: the Orators also in there Proemes,
narrationes, confirmationes, and perora-
tionnes labour to obserue this order which
they call the methode artificiall & naturall.
Here Cicero first proponeth the matter and
next parte: *h*it. *Thou hast bene this fowertene*
yeares questor (sayeth he) Cn. Papyrius being
cōsul: & I accuse thee of all thinges which thou
hast done from that day to this day: there shall
not be one hower found void of thy theft, ma-
litious doing, crueltie, and mischief. Here is
the

the somme: now followeth the generall partition. *All the yeares (sayeth he) are spent either in the office of the questure: in the ambassade made in Asia: in the office of the preture pertaining to the towne: or in the office of the preture, among the Siciliens. And therefore into these fower partes my whole accusation shall be parted. Of the which fower partes, and the least member of every parte he treateth afterwarde, every on in his owne order and place. And in the third oration knitteth together the first three partes with transitiones. Now (sayeth he) seeing I have shewen his office of questure and first dignitie to be full of theft and mischievous doing, I pray you give care to the rest. Then after he hath shewen the faulces of the Ambassade, followeth the transition to the office of the preture. But now let vs come (sayeth he) to that worthy preturie and to those faulces, which be more manifest to those that be here present, than to me although I have studied and prepared my selfe to declare the same. This transition is more imperfect lacking and epilogue. And last in the beginning of the fowerth oration he maketh such a transition to the fowerth parte, which is of the preturie among the*

Siciliens. *There is many things (honorable Iudges) which of necessitie I must pretermitt, to thende I maye speake a litle of these things committed to my charge. For I have taken upon me the cause of Sicilia, that charge hath pulled us to this busines. So Liuius in the beginning comprehendeth the somme of seuentie yeares, and therafter deuised the same by decades.*

C A P. XVII.

Of the craftie and secrete methode.

THIS methode then in diuers euuntiations of one kinde, being knowen either by their owne disposition, or the disposition of the Sillogisme shalbe obserued how often soeuer the matter is clearly to be vnderstanded: But when with delectation or some other motion thy chiefe purpose is to deceaue the auditor, then thou shalt put some thing away which doth appartaine to thy matter, as definitions, diuisions and transitions: and set in their places things appertaining nothing to the matter: as digressions from the purpose, and long tarrying vpon the matter: but most chiefly see that in the beginning thou inuerte thy order, and place some antecedentes

cedentes after their consequents. And surely this more imperfect forme of methode in respect of the exact rule obserued in the other, is not only mutilate by reason of the taking away of some of the matter : & remoueth by the cking to of things extraordinary: but hauing some degrees of the order inuerced, is preposterous and out of all good fashion and order.



